Scarinci Hollenbeck, LLC
The Firm
201-896-4100 info@sh-law.comAuthor: Scarinci Hollenbeck, LLC|February 6, 2014
U.S. businesses started the October 2013 Supreme Court Term with a key victory for employers. Earlier this month, the justices unanimously ruled that U.S. Steel Corp. did not have to pay unionized employees for time spent changing in and out of protective gear under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Under the Fair labor Standard Act (FLSA), the clock starts running on employee compensation when the worker engages in a “principal activity.” Accordingly, courts have held that workers must be compensated for the time they spend donning and doffing required uniforms and safety gear, unless it is de minimis.
However, the rules are different for unionized employees. Under section 203(o) of the FLSA, an employer is not required to compensate a worker for time spent “changing clothes” (even if it is a principal activity) if that time is expressly excluded from compensable time under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement.
The decision in Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp. resolves a circuit split regarding how to resolve the two provisions of the FLSA. The justices ultimately concluded that the majority of the protective gear at issue in the case fell under the definition of “clothes” in Section 203(o) and, therefore, the time was not compensable.
“Dictionaries from the era of [Section] 203(o)’s enactment indicate that ‘clothes’ denotes items that are both designed and used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress,” Justice Antonin Scalia wrote. “[N]othing in the text or context of [Section] 203(o) suggests anything other than the ordinary meaning of ‘clothes.’ ”
Scalia further noted that there was “no basis for the proposition that the unmodified term ‘clothes’ somehow omits protective clothing.” With regard to safety gear such as glasses and earplugs, Scalia conceded that they were not typically viewed as clothes.
However, the justices concluded that a decision treating these types of protective items differently would create confusion for courts down the road. It is unlikely that Congress intended to “convert federal judges into time-study professionals,” Scalia wrote.
If you have any questions about this case or would like to discuss how it may impact your company’s wage and hour policies, please contact me, Christine Vanek, or the Scarinci Hollenbeck attorney with whom you work.
The Firm
201-896-4100 info@sh-law.comU.S. businesses started the October 2013 Supreme Court Term with a key victory for employers. Earlier this month, the justices unanimously ruled that U.S. Steel Corp. did not have to pay unionized employees for time spent changing in and out of protective gear under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Under the Fair labor Standard Act (FLSA), the clock starts running on employee compensation when the worker engages in a “principal activity.” Accordingly, courts have held that workers must be compensated for the time they spend donning and doffing required uniforms and safety gear, unless it is de minimis.
However, the rules are different for unionized employees. Under section 203(o) of the FLSA, an employer is not required to compensate a worker for time spent “changing clothes” (even if it is a principal activity) if that time is expressly excluded from compensable time under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement.
The decision in Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp. resolves a circuit split regarding how to resolve the two provisions of the FLSA. The justices ultimately concluded that the majority of the protective gear at issue in the case fell under the definition of “clothes” in Section 203(o) and, therefore, the time was not compensable.
“Dictionaries from the era of [Section] 203(o)’s enactment indicate that ‘clothes’ denotes items that are both designed and used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress,” Justice Antonin Scalia wrote. “[N]othing in the text or context of [Section] 203(o) suggests anything other than the ordinary meaning of ‘clothes.’ ”
Scalia further noted that there was “no basis for the proposition that the unmodified term ‘clothes’ somehow omits protective clothing.” With regard to safety gear such as glasses and earplugs, Scalia conceded that they were not typically viewed as clothes.
However, the justices concluded that a decision treating these types of protective items differently would create confusion for courts down the road. It is unlikely that Congress intended to “convert federal judges into time-study professionals,” Scalia wrote.
If you have any questions about this case or would like to discuss how it may impact your company’s wage and hour policies, please contact me, Christine Vanek, or the Scarinci Hollenbeck attorney with whom you work.
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